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Strategic Insights: The Great Purge and
the Future of the Turkish Military
August 30, 2016 | Dr. W. Andrew Terrill

The full story of the July 15-16, 2016, Turkish coup attempt may not be known for some
time, but it is clear that a limited number of officers attempted to overthrow the
government and either capture or kill elected President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The
government has accused these officers of belonging to the Fethullah Gulen movement
(Hizmet), which is certainly possible since many of Turkey’s most secular military leaders
were removed in earlier purges when Erdogan and Gulen were allies. These secular senior
officers were often replaced by individuals associated with either the ruling Justice and
Development Party (AKP) or the Gulenist movement, which the government did not view
as a threat prior to 2013.1 Since then, Erdogan has viewed Gulen as an enemy, and the
clerical leader has remained in voluntary exile in Saylorsburg, Pennsylvania.2 Erdogan is
now seeking Gulen’s extradition to Turkey on charges of masterminding the coup, but his
government has produced no clear evidence to back up that request.
Despite the rebels’ grandiose plans, it remains deeply unclear that the coup came
within a “hairsbreadth of succeeding” as reported by TIME and affirmed by various other
Western media outlets.3 Any revolt that results in 290 dead and captures no military
installations is off to a bad start. Under such circumstances, a coup is not moving
forward, and somebody is fighting back. Even if the centerpiece of the plotter’s strategy
had worked and Erdogan was captured or killed, it is doubtful that the uprising would
have succeeded. Prime Minister Binali Yildirim and other government leaders would
probably have been able to rally opponents to a military takeover, which seems
increasingly at odds with the changes in Turkish political culture. The coup effort also
failed quickly because it had relatively little support from within the military, and its
authors attempted to organize the uprising outside of the chain of command.4 Some

analysis suggests that it was further bungled because the officers involved were afraid of
being purged from the military for previous subversive activities and moved forward with
limited resources and support out of desperation.5
Yet, if the coup itself was poorly planned and organized, the countermeasures have
been expansive and brutal.6 In response to the attempt, the Turkish president stated
that, “This uprising is a gift from God to us because this will be a reason to cleanse our
army.”7 He also declared a three-month renewable state of emergency thereby vastly
increasing his power to move forward against suspected supporters of the coup and any
other domestic enemies.8 The clear consequence of such activities is that the Erdogan
government has moved to purge the Turkish military using the failed coup as an excuse to
completely remake the Turkish national security establishment. Devlet Bahceli, the leader
of the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), refused to support the coup effort, but
has also opposed the scope and comprehensiveness of the purge, warning that Turkey
could be left with a hollowed out and politicized military such as those of Saddam
Hussein and Muammar Qadhafi.9 An early analysis of the purge seems to indicate that
this statement may not be much of an exaggeration.
In the near-term aftermath of the coup attempt, over 6,000 military personnel were
taken into custody. Many intelligence and police officials were also placed under
arrest.10 By early August, 10,012 military service members were reported to have been
detained.11 Those arrested included the commander of Turkey’s second army which is
deployed along the Syrian and Iraqi borders.12 Many officers have also been reported to
have been dismissed through forced resignations, and at least 1,700 military personnel
have been dishonorably discharged for their supposed sympathies with the coup.
Turkey’s military command structure is therefore in shambles with many key
commanders removed from their posts, despite an absence of evidence that they were
involved with the coup.13 Before the coup attempt, Turkey had roughly 360 active duty
general grade and flag officers, of which about 40 percent have been removed from their
positions following the coup attempt. To address the corresponding shortage of general
grade officers, large numbers of colonels were promoted to general, and have been
required to assume the duties of the purged military leadership. In one quick series of
moves, 99 officers were promoted to general or admiral from lower ranks, primarily on
the basis of loyalty to Erdogan.14 Additionally critical military personnel such as combat
aircraft pilots have also been extensively purged. Defense Minister Fikri Isik has
promised to address the resulting shortage of pilots, but has given no indication of how
this will be done.15
The government has further moved to shut down existing Turkish military academies
and stated that it will replace them with a “National Defense University,” which has not
been well defined. Erdogan also closed all four military high schools, the most important
of which is Istanbul’s Kuleli Military High School.16 This school was established in 1845

to provide a modern secular curriculum and help Westernize the Ottoman military, with
the others being created later in the same spirit. The government claims that these high
schools had been deeply infiltrated by the Gulenist movement and were beyond
rehabilitation. Research by Turkish-American scholar and journalist Pinar Tremblay has
confirmed some of these allegations noting that many non-Gulenist students were
pressured and harassed into leaving these schools for failing to support this movement.17
Closing the schools nevertheless seems to be a drastic solution. A more reasonable
approach would be to replace any Gulenist faculty in these institutions.
Turkey’s Supreme Military Council has also been redesigned. The civilian defense
minister seems to have taken over many of the duties of the Chief of the General Staff,
General Hulusi Akar, although he remains on active duty as do the chiefs of the army,
navy, and air force. The army maintains that Akar proved his loyalty by refusing at
gunpoint to sign a document in support of the attempted overthrow of the government,
which the plotters wanted him to read on television.18 The generals who remain in power
nevertheless are clearly in danger of being fired or imprisoned at a later date and have
only a very limited ability to articulate military priorities and interests. Right now their
safest course is to worry about their own futures and not the efficiency of the military.
Moreover, morale throughout the military, but especially at the senior leadership level, is
at rock bottom. Even before the 2016 coup attempt, the Turkish military suffered from a
series of purges, arrests, and forced resignations. In a 2014 book, Turkish scholar Soner
Cagaptay characterized the officer corps as demoralized and with its prestige in “free
fall.”19 In the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt, it is difficult to imagine the military
having much more esprit de corps than the inmates of a prison.
The turmoil within the Turkish military comes at a particularly important time for the
United States and its European allies. Turkey is a key state in the anti-ISIS coalition,
although it initially was slow to move against ISIS for a variety of reasons including: a fear
of further empowering the Kurdish militias fighting ISIS, a deep hatred of Syria’s Assad
government, and a concern about provoking ISIS revenge strikes. Turkey is also a key
player in addressing the problem of Syrian refugees. Unfortunately for any future efforts
to address these problems, U.S.-Turkish relations have deteriorated sharply after
Ankara’s suggestions that the United States was involved in the coup effort. The U.S.
leadership has treated these claims as false and offensive, but the increasingly rigid press
censorship in Turkey ensures that they are well publicized domestically. July 2016 would
also seem to be a particularly strange time for the United States to support a coup since
Erdogan had finally emerged as a tough and committed enemy of ISIS following a series
of ISIS terrorist actions against Turkey culminating in the Ataturk Airport bombing in
Istanbul in late June. Likewise, the United States leadership was pleased that Turkey had
moved to normalize relations with Israel. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is
particularly unlikely that many U.S. policymakers would view Gulen so favorably that
they would take serious risks to support a power bid by him.

U.S. advice to Turkey about internal matters is clearly unwelcome at this time, and the
Erdogan government has been infuriated by U.S. and European complaints about the
scope of the purges. Erdogan’s own brush with capture and potential execution has
probably not done much to help him put the situation in perspective. He may also have
been influenced by the fact that some of his own military aides were part of the
conspiracy. The United States and NATO may therefore have to adjust to a situation in
which Turkey and the Turkish military are exceptionally consumed with domestic
problems. Turkish complaints that the United States was involved in the coup do not
help matters. Moreover, there remains the strong possibility that Gulen will not be
extradited because of the Constitutional protections provided to him as a U.S. permanent
resident. As noted by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy, the political
branches of the U.S. Government do not have the power to “switch the Constitution on or
off at will.”20 President Obama and his successor do not have the power to circumvent
due process on this issue, even if they wished to do so, regardless of how they feel about
the request.
The United States will therefore have to navigate the extremely difficult waters of U.S.Turkish relations, with the expectation that serious setbacks will occur and that militaryto-military relations may become maddeningly difficult. Turkish military leaders may
well be more concerned with staying out of jail rather than fighting ISIS. Newly promoted
generals may or may not be competent, and it is doubtful that they will be as effective or
decisive as previous leaders who have worked with the anti-ISIS coalition. Nevertheless,
at the present time, Turkey is insisting that it will meet its military obligations and
continue to play an important role in fighting ISIS. The U.S. military leadership will have
to proceed on the basis of this promised cooperation so long as it is possible to do so. U.S.
leaders also have to understand that under the current situation, Turkey still has a
tremendous vested interest in cooperating with the United States on security matters
where possible. The current waves of uncertainty about Turkey’s future resulting from
the purge threaten to undermine foreign investment in the economy and further damage
the already ailing tourist industry. Eventually, the Turkish leadership is going to have to
stop worrying about revenge against the military and start addressing the national
security problems of the country including ISIS terrorism within their borders.
Otherwise, CHP leader Bahceli’s warning may prove prophetic, and Turkey will emerge
with a military with poor leaders, low professionalism, and a limited capacity to engage in
serious military operations.
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